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Abstract. The mechanical verification of the root contention protocol from the 
physical layer of the IEEE1394a standard [1] for a high performance serial bus 
is described. In this case study, the Uppaal2k [2, 3] model checker of real-time 
systems is utilized. An enhanced model of the protocol is presented, which 
corrects for imperfections in the communication model from [4]. Using this new 
model, the correctness of the root contention protocol is demonstrated. The 
required timing constraints are established via analysis of the protocol and via 
approximate parameter analysis. 
1   Introduction 
Various recent studies have evidenced the maturity of automated tools for the 
verification of realistic applications [5, 6]. Several case studies are reported in which 
automatic verification tools are used to analyze IEEE standards. The first and 
probably best-known example is the verification of the IEEE Futurebus+ standard by 
Clarke and his students using SMV [20]. This verification revealed several errors that 
were previously undetected. In [21], using the Caesar/Aldebaran toolset, a deadlock 
was revealed in the draft IEEE 1394 standard. 
In this work, we investigate the applicability of the latest version of Uppaal [2, 3] to 
analyze the IEEE 1394 root contention protocol [1], a real-time leader election 
protocol for two processes. We examine to what extent we can use Uppaal to do 
parametric analysis and verification via stepwise abstraction. 
As far as we know, our case study is the first time that a timed-automata-based tool 
is used to analyze a (draft) IEEE standard. Given the importance of timing constraints 
in many of these standards, we believe this to be a significant step forward. Although 
our analysis did not reveal any errors, we did discover a number of minor points were 
the standard is incomplete. 
Timing parameters play an essential role in the root contention protocol. For certain 
parameter values, the protocol is correct, and for other values it fails. We are 
interested in deriving the precise constraints that ensure correctness. There are 
currently two tools available that (at least in some cases, see [7]) can do parametric 
analysis of timed systems: HyTech [8], and PMC [9]. Since the performance of 
Hytech is limited, and we expected the protocol to be too complex for it, and since 
only a prototype of the parametric model checker PMC is currently available, we 
decided to use the Uppaal tool. Uppaal has already been applied in various 
verifications [10-13, refs. in 3]. It can model real-time systems with a finite control 
structure. A limited class of properties, viz. reachability properties, can be checked 
automatically and efficiently. Our protocol models fit naturally into its input language. 
By analyzing numerous instances of the protocol for different values of the 
parameters, Uppaal allowed us to do an approximate parameter analysis. 
A manual verification of the root contention protocol has been carried out in [4], 
where two timing constraints where inferred that ensured protocol correctness. As an 
introduction to this case study, we mechanically checked the proof invariants in the 
model from [4], using a state mapping. Our Uppaal experiments affirm that all 
invariants hold under the conditions mentioned in [4]. Details are available from [17]. 
The latter result has been established independently in [19] using the tool PMC. 
The main contribution of this work, however, is the improved protocol model that is 
presented, which we believe now carefully reflects the IEEE 1394 specification. The 
main difference between the models from [4] and from this work is the way in which 
communication between the processes is modeled: by a package mechanism and by 
continuous-time signals, respectively. 
Using the new, enhanced model, we investigate the correct operation of the root 
contention protocol with Uppaal. The constraints that we deduce for this are stricter 
than those in [4]. Unlike other Uppaal case studies, we have carried out the 
verification using stepwise abstraction, similarly to [4]. In this method, we do not 
relate the implementation and the specification model immediately, but use several 
intermediate automata. This method is common practice in automaton-based 
verification, but not in the context of model checkers. Unlike [4], we do not consider 
probabilistic aspects of the protocol in this work. 
The modeling and verification effectively took us about one month. The first author 
has a background in applied physics, not in computer science. Most of the time has 
been spent in understanding the IEEE 1394 standard and in several prototype-model 
improvements. Time could have been saved by automating tasks, such as certain 
syntactic operations on the automaton models and repeated verification of the same 
properties for different instances of the parameter values in a model. 
Section 2 informally describes the root contention protocol, and section 3 briefly 
introduces model checking with Uppaal. Section 4 presents the new protocol model 
and contains the associated verification results. Finally, in section 5, conclusions are 
given. 
2   The IEEE 1394a Root Contention Protocol 
The IEEE 1394-1995 standard [16] for a high performance serial bus specifies a bus 
that supports isochronous and asynchronous data transfers, peer-to-peer, among up to 
64 high-performance devices. Also, the bus is hot-plug-and-play, which makes it 
suitable for interconnecting digital multimedia and consumer electronics. At this 
moment, the IEEE 1394a supplement [1] to the standard is about to be released, which 
includes several clarifications, extensions, and performance improvements. 
In the IEEE 1394 standard, four protocol layers have been defined. The Physical 
layer (PHY) is the lowest, and provides the electrical and mechanical interface for 
data transmission across the bus. Furthermore, it handles bus configuration, 
arbitration, and data transmission. All 1394 nodes (devices) have one or more ports. 
Each port may be connected to one other node’s port, via a bi-directional cable. Nodes 
should be connected in a tree-like topology, without cycles. First, bus configuration is 
performed. This is done automatically upon a bus reset: after power up and after 
device addition or removal. After that, nodes can arbitrate for access to the bus and 
transfer data to any node, peer-to-peer. The bus configuration process starts upon a 
bus reset with a bus initialization. This is followed by the tree-identify phase (Tree 
ID). In this phase, it is checked whether the bus topology is a tree and, if so, a leader is 
elected among the nodes in the tree. Finally, in the self-identify phase (Self  ID), each 
node selects a unique physical ID and identifies itself to the other nodes. 
The purpose of the Tree ID phase is to identify the root node and the topology of 
all attached nodes. All ports will become either child or parent ports; a child port 
connects to a node further away from the root, whereas a parent port connects to a 
node closer to the root. The root node, which only has child ports, is elected as the 
leader. Informally, the basic operation of the leader election protocol is as follows: 
each node can drive a signal via the bi-directional cable to its nearest neighbor node 
(with a certain propagation delay). During the Tree ID phase, a node can drive a 
PARENT_NOTIFY signal or a CHILD_NOTIFY signal, or leave the line undriven 
(IDLE). The PARENT_NOTIFY signal is to ask the other node to become parent of the 
sending node, which is acknowledged by a CHILD_NOTIFY signal in return. Upon 
receipt of a CHILD_NOTIFY signal on a port, the PARENT_NOTIFY signal is removed 
to acknowledge this receipt. 
A node will only send a PARENT_NOTIFY signal via a port, after it has received a 
PARENT_NOTIFY signal on all other ports. Thus, initially, only the leaf nodes send out 
a PARENT_NOTIFY signal. Ports on which a PARENT_NOTIFY signal is received are 
marked as child ports, and ports on which a CHILD_NOTIFY signal is received are 
marked as parent ports. If a node has received PARENT_NOTIFY signals on all of its 
ports, it only has child ports and it knows that is has been elected as the root of the 
tree. In the final stage of the Tree ID phase, however, it is possible that upon detecting 
that all but one of their ports have become child ports, two neighboring nodes each 
attempt to find their parent by sending a PARENT_NOTIFY signal to each other. In this 
case, these two nodes are in root contention. The root contention protocol is then 
initiated, to select one of the two nodes as the root of the tree. 
2.1  The Root Contention Protocol 
If a node receives a PARENT_NOTIFY signal on a port, while sending a 
PARENT_NOTIFY signal on that port, it knows it is in root contention. Note that root 
contention is detected by each of the two contending nodes (Node 1 and Node 2 
individually. Upon detection of root contention, a node backs off by removing the 
PARENT_NOTIFY signal, and leaving the line in the IDLE state. At the same time, it 
starts a timer and picks a random bit. If the random bit is one, the node will wait for a 
time ROOT_CONTEND_SLOW, whereas if the random bit is zero, it will wait for a 
shorter time ROOT_CONTENT_FAST. Table 2.1 lists the wait times as specified in 
the latest draft version of the IEEE 1394a standard [1]. 
When its timer expires, a node samples its contention port once again. If it sees 
IDLE, it starts sending PARENT_NOTIFY anew and starts waiting to see a 
CHILD_NOTIFY signal in return as an acknowledgment. When the timer of a node 
expires and this node will sample the PARENT_NOTIFY on its port, it will send the 
CHILD_NOTIFY signal back as an acknowledgement and it knows that it has to take on 
the role of the bus root. However, in the case that both nodes pick identical random 
bits, there is a chance of root contention again: each node may see an IDLE signal 
when its timer expires and the both start sending the PARENT_NOTIFY signal. In this 
case, both nodes will detect renewed root contention and the whole process is repeated 
until one of them becomes root. 
Table 2.1: Root contend wait times from IEEE 1394a [1]. 
 minimum maximum 
ROOT_CONTEND_FAST rc_fast_min (760 ns) rc_fast_max (850 ns) 
ROOT_CONTENT_SLOW rc_slow_min (1590 ns) rc_slow_max (1670 ns) 
2.2  Protocol Timing Constraints and their Implications 
The timing parameters that are used in the protocol include the wait-times as listed in 
Table 2.1, and the delay parameter, which corresponds to the total time from sending 
a signal by one node to receiving it by the other node. It includes the cable 
propagation delay, and the time to process the cable line-states by the hardware and 
software layers at the ports of the two nodes. For the protocol to work correctly, two 
constraints on these timing parameters are essential (equations 2.1 and 2.2). 
2 * delay < rc_fast_min . (2.1) 
2 * delay < rc_slow_min - rc_fast_max . (2.2) 
The origin of these equations is visualized in Figure 2.1 and explained below. 
Ad equation 2.1: In case of Node 2 selecting the short waiting period, constraint 
equation 2.1 ensures that the IDLE signal from Node 1 arrives at Node 2 before the 
waiting period of Node 2 ends (See circle 1 in Figure 2.1). Otherwise, Node 2 might 
still see the first PARENT_NOTIFY signal from Node 1, and erroneously send a 
CHILD_NOTIFY signal to acknowledge this parent request. Once the IDLE signal from 
Node 1 arrives (behind schedule), Node 2 removes its CHILD_NOTIFY signal again 
and makes itself root. When Node 1 ends its waiting period, however, it will see the 
IDLE signal from Node 2, as if nothing happened, and send a PARENT_NOTIFY to 
Node 2. Awaiting the response it will time out, which leads to a bus reset. Therefore, 
constraint equation 2.1 is required for correct protocol operation. 
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Figure 2.1: Visualization of the protocol timing constraints (see text for details) 
Ad equation 2.2: In case of Node 1 selecting the short waiting period and Node 2 
selecting the long waiting period, constraint equation 2.2 ensures that the new 
PARENT_NOTIFY signal from Node 1 arrives at Node 2 before the waiting period of 
Node 2 ends (See circle 2 in Figure 2.1). Otherwise, Node 2 might still see the IDLE 
signal from Node 1, and start sending a new PARENT_NOTIFY signal. Together with 
the PARENT_NOTIFY message coming from Node 1 (after schedule), this will again 
lead to root contention, although the two nodes picked different timers. Therefore, 
constraint equation 2.2 is required to ensure that root contention can only occur for a 
second time if both nodes pick equal random bits and wait times. 
 
This analysis is based on informal notes [14, 15] to the IEEE-P1394a Working 
Group. The equations from [14] match ours, whereas [15] incorrectly cites [14] and 
contains errors. Note that these timing constraints do not appear in the IEEE 1394 
specification [1, 16]. In [4], the above scenario cannot be mimicked, due to an 
imperfection in its model, and weaker constraint equations are found. 
The IEEE 1394a root contention wait times, as given in Table 2.1, together with the 
timing constraint equations 2.1 and 2.2, imply delay < 370 ns. The cable propagation 
delay, according to the IEEE 1394a standard, should be less or equal than 5.05 ns/m. 
Unfortunately, any additional processing delays are not explicitly specified in the 
standard. Disregarding such extra delays, a maximum cable length between two nodes 
of 370 ns / 5.05 ns/m = 73 m is allowed. In the IEEE 1394a standard the cable length 
is, at the moment, limited to 4.5 m by the worst-case round-trip propagation delay 
during bus arbitration. The above timing constraints require the root contention times 
to be longer, when cable lengths increase significantly. This may be disadvantageous 
to future applications, and alternative root contention protocols may become 
necessary. 
3   Model Checking and Uppaal 
Uppaal [2, 3] is a tool box suitable for modeling, simulation and automatic 
verification of real-time systems, based on timed automata. In this work, the latest 
version of Uppaal (Uppaal2k) was used. Uppaal can simulate a model, i.e. provide a 
particular execution of the system, and it can automatically check whether a given 
(reachability) property is satisfied by the system. If the property is not satisfied, a 
diagnostic trace is provided showing how the property is violated. For an introduction 
to Uppaal, we refer to [3] which is available from the web. Section 3.1 summarizes 
this document. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 give a short introduction to verification based on 
timed automata. 
3.1  System Description in Uppaal 
In this section, an informal introduction to Uppaal is given (see [3] for details). A 
system in Uppaal is modeled as a collection of non-deterministic processes with a 
finite control structure and real-valued clocks. Communication between processes 
takes place via channels (i.e. via binary synchronization on complementary actions) or 
via shared integer variables. Within Uppaal it is possible to model automata via a 
graphical description. Furthermore, templates are available to facilitate the 
specification of multiple automata with the same control structure simultaneously. 
Basically, a process is a finite-state machine (or labeled transition system) extended 
with clock and integer variables. Operations on integer variables that are available 
are: addition, subtraction, and multiplication with a constant. Furthermore, clock 
constraints can be set via the comparison of (differences in) clock values with an 
integer. The nodes of an automaton describe the control locations. Each location can 
be decorated with an invariant: a number of clock bounds expressing the clock values 
that are allowed that location. The edges of the transition system represent the changes 
between control locations. Each edge can be labeled by a guard, an action, and a 
number of clock resets and integer variable assignments. All three types of labels are 
optional. A guard is an inequality over integer and clock variables, expressing when 
the transition is enabled, i.e. when it can be taken. When it is taken, clock resets and 
integer variable assignments, if present, are executed. The action label, if present, 
enforces binary synchronization. This means that exactly one of the other processes 
should take a complementary action (where a! and a? are complementary). If no 
other process is able to synchronize on the action, the transition is not enabled. A 
process can have a state from which more than one transition is enabled, with the same 
action. Hence non-deterministic choices can be specified within Uppaal. Note that 
time can only elapse at the locations (conform invariants). Transitions are taken 
instantaneously, i.e. no time elapses during transitions. Three special types of 
locations are available:  
Initial locations define the initial state of the system (exactly one per process). 
Urgent locations are locations in which no time can be spent, hence a shorthand 
notation for a location that satisfies the virtual invariant x<0. The (fresh) clock x is 
reset on all transitions to the urgent location. 
Committed locations are used to make the action in the incoming transition and the 
action on the outgoing transition atomic. Process execution cannot be interrupted and 
no time elapses. They can be used to encode multi-way synchronization in Uppaal. 
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Figure 3.1: An example Uppaal process automaton (Buffer) 
Consider the Buffer process automaton displayed in Figure 3.1. This automaton 
models a one-place buffer through which messages are passed with a time delay from 
a Sender process to a Receiver process (not shown in Figure 3.1). Data elements are 
delivered through the Buffer process with a time delay between 12 and 15 time units. 
Uppaal is able to automatically analyze reachability properties. These properties 
must be of the form E<>(p) or A[](p), where p is Boolean expression on clock 
and integer variable constraints and/or on locations of the automata. Informally, 
E<>(p) denotes that there must be some state (=location+clock and integer variable 
values) which is reachable from the initial state and in which the property p holds. 
Dually, A[](p) denotes that p holds for all reachable states, i.e. that p is an invariant 
of the automaton. This logic is sufficient to specify safety properties, invariants, and 
bounded liveness properties. However, general liveness and fairness properties, and 
the repeated occurrence of an event, infinitely often, cannot be expressed in Uppaal. 
3.2  Theoretical Background 
Given the control location and the values of the clock and data variables of an 
automaton, we can determine whether a transition can be taken or whether time can 
elapse in this location. This is expressed by the associated timed labeled transition 
system (TLTS) to an automaton. The states of the TLTS consists of a control location, 
a clock valuation and a data valuation. A valuation is function that assigns a value to 
each (in this case clock and data) variable. If the automaton consists of several 
components, then the control location is in fact a tuple containing the control locations 
of each component. The TLTS is equipped with time passage actions s →d s' that 
augment the clocks in s with d time units and leave the location unchanged, resulting 
in the state s'. Such a transition is enabled in the TLTS if augmenting the clocks with d 
time units is allowed by the state invariant in s. The discrete actions (where internal 
actions of the automaton are labeled with τ) s →a s' change the control location and 
update the data variables, leaving the clocks untouched. It is enabled if there exists a 
a-transition in the Uppaal automaton, such that the guard of this transition is set for 
the clock values in s. Hence, the TLTS has an infinite set of states, actions and − for 
non-trivial automata − transitions. The initial state of the TLTS is given by the initial 
location and the clock and data valuations that assign zero to each variable. A timed 
execution of a TLTS is a possibly infinite sequence s0, a1, s1, a1, … such that for all i, 
si is a state and ai is a (discrete or delay) action, and si →ai+1  si+1 is a transition. A 
timed execution of an Uppaal model is a timed execution of its underlying TLTS − a 
sequence (s0, c0, d0), a0, (s1, c1, d1), a1, (s2, c2, d2), … where si, ci, di are a location, 
clock valuation and a data valuation respectively. 
Notation 3.1: The sets of timed traces of a TLTS or an automaton A are both 
denoted by ttrace(A). We write A   TTR B if ttrace(A)   ttrace(B). 
A timed trace (of either an automaton or a TLTS) arises from an execution by omitting 
the states and internal actions. A state is reachable if there exists an execution passing 
through it. Theorem 3.2 expresses the main result by Alur and Dill [18], upon which 
Uppaal and other model checkers, based on timed automata, are built: 
Theorem 3.2: The set of reachable states of a timed automaton is decidable. 
An important class of automata and TLTS are the deterministic systems. Intuitively, 
determinism means that given the current state (for an automaton this includes the 
location and clock values.) and the action to be taken, the next state (if any) is 
uniquely determined. 
Definition 3.5: 1. A TLTS is called deterministic if for every state s and every 
action label a there is at most one transition s →a t, and there are no τ-transisions. 
2. An automaton is called deterministic if for every state s and every action label a, 
s →(a,g,Y) t s →(a,g',Y') t' with t≠t' implies that g and g' are disjoint, (i.e. g ∧ g' is 
unsatisfiable). 
It is not difficult to prove that if an automaton is deterministic then its underlying 
TLTS is so. 
3.3  Verification of Timed Trace Inclusion 
Within automaton-based verification, it is common practice to give both the 
implementation and the specification of the protocol as automata. One automaton A is 
said to implement another one B if A  TTR B. The rest of this section describes how 
this relation can be checked by Uppaal. 
Although in general it is undecidable whether A  TTR B, Alur and Dill [18] have 
shown that deciding whether A  TTR B can be reduced to reachability checking, 
provided that B is deterministic. This is done via the automaton Berr, which adds a 
state error to B and transitions s →(a,g) error for all states s and a such that this 
transition is enabled if no other a-transition is enabled from s, or if the invariant in s 
does not hold. All state invariants are removed. 
Proposition 3.6: Assume that B is deterministic. Then A  TTR B ⇔ Berr is reachable 
in the composition of A and Berr. 
If B is non-deterministic, then we can try to make it so by renaming the labels and then 
use the above method. The following result states that, after a consistent re-labeling of 
A and B into C and D, respectively, C  TTR D ⇒ A  TTR B. 
Lemma 3.7: Suppose that A, B, C, and D are TLTSs, such that C and D have the 
same set of action labels. h is a (re-labeling) function mapping the discrete actions of 
C to those of A, with h(τ) = τ. Suppose that: 
1. A is obtained from C by  replacing every discrete action a in C by h(a), 
2. Similarly, B is obtained from C by applying replacing every discrete action a in D 
  by h(a). 
Then C  TTR D ⇒ A  TTR B. 
The problem is now to find for given automata A, and B, an automaton C and a 
deterministic automaton D such that their underlying TLTSs fulfill the conditions from 
lemma 3.7. In our verification, we constructed C from A and a step refinement r, 
yielding an automaton Ar, and D from B and r, yielding Br. Informally, a step 
refinement is a function r (on the TLTSs) from the state space of A to the state space 
of B such that every transition s →a t of A can be mimicked in the second by the 
transition r(s) →a r(t) of B, where we also allow internal transitions in A to be 
mimicked by remaining in the same state in B. We conjecture that the method we used 
can be generalized and that it is possible to construct in that way the desired automata 
C and D from a step refinement from A to B in finite representation. Although the 
existence of a step refinement already implies timed trace inclusion, this construction 
would yield a method to check this with Uppaal. 
4   The Enhanced Protocol Model 
A manual verification of the root contention protocol is described in [4]. However, a 
major difference between the model in [4] and the enhanced model presented in this 
work lies in the way in which communication between the nodes across the wires is 
handled. In [4], this is modeled as the transfer of single messages (PARENT_NOTIFY 
or CHILD_NOTIFY) that are sent only once, and upon reception removed from the 
wire. Also, messages can be overwritten and lost. This abstraction is inappropriate, 
since in IEEE 1394, communication is done via signals continuously being driven 
across the wire. These signals persist at the input-port of the receiving node, until the 
sending node changes its output-port signal. Besides driving PARENT_NOTIFY and 
CHILD_NOTIFY signals, the wire can be left undriven (IDLE). We believe that the 
enhanced model presented in this work now adequately reflects the root contention 
protocol as specified in the draft IEEE 1394a standard [1]. With this model, we will 
show that constraints 2.1 and 2.2 are both necessary and sufficient for the correctness 
of the protocol. 
4.1  The Protocol Model Automata 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 display the Uppaal templates of the Node and Wire automata of 
the enhanced model. These template automata are instantiated to a total system (Impl) 
of two nodes Node1 and Node2, connected by a bi-directional communication channel 
(Wire12 for messages from Node1 to Node2, and Wire21 for the opposite direction). 
The Uppaal model files can be found on the web [17]. 
 almost_child 
almost_root 
child 
req_idle_fast 
x<=rc_fast_max 
rec_idle_slow 
x<=rc_slow_max 
rec_req_fast 
x<=rc_fast_max 
rec_req_slow 
x<=rc_slow_max 
root 
root_contention 
snt_req rec_idle 
child! root! 
rec_req? 
rec_req? 
x>=rc_fast_min 
snd_ack! 
x>=rc_slow_min 
snd_ack! 
rec_ack? 
rec_req? 
rec_idle? 
rec_idle? 
rec_idle? 
rec_req? 
x:=0 
snd_idle! 
x:=0 
snd_idle! 
x:=0 
snd_idle! 
x>=rc_fast_min 
snd_req! 
x>=rc_slow_min 
snd_req! 
x:=0 
snd_idle! 
 
Figure 4.1: The Uppaal Node automaton template 
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Figure 4.2: The Uppaal Wire automaton template 
First of all, the PARENT_NOTIFY message has been abbreviated to req, and the 
CHILD_NOTIFY message to ack. A number of timing parameter constants is defined 
to include the root contention wait times and the cable propagation delay into the 
model. The root contention wait times, like rc_fast_min, have been set to the 
values as specified in Table 2.1. The channels like snd_ack and rec_req are used 
to send and receive ack and req messages by the nodes through the wires. The 
slow/fast differentiation causes the Node automaton to be rather symmetric. The 
root and child channels are used to audit the root/child status of each node, via a 
dummy AuditStatus automaton. 
A key property of I/O automata is that they are always input-enabled, i.e. no input 
is blocked. The Uppaal Node automata were also made input-enabled, by adding both 
an error state and synchronization transitions to this error state from all states in 
which input (via rec_req and rec_ack) would otherwise be blocked. The 
verification that the error state in this Nodeerr automata cannot be reached, implies 
equivalence between this input-enabled Nodeerr automaton and the Node automaton 
without the error state, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Starting in the root contention state, a Node picks a random bit (slow or fast). 
Simultaneously timer x is reset, and an idle message is sent to the Wire, which 
models the removal of the PARENT_NOTIFY signal. Independently, but at about the 
same time, the contending Node also sends an idle, possibly followed by a renewed 
req. Therefore, the reception of this idle and req message is interleaved with the 
choice of the random bit and with the sending of the idle message. In this way, the 
two contending Node automata can operate autonomously. 
The Wire templates have been extended, compared to the model in [4], such that 
they can now transmit PARENT_NOTIFY (req), CHILD_NOTIFY (ack), and IDLE 
(idle) messages. These messages mark the leading edge of a new signal being driven 
across the wire. Until a new message arrives, signals continue to be driven across the 
wire. Furthermore, the wires now comprise a two-place buffer, such that two messages 
at the same time can travel across a wire. Using an additional error-state, which has 
been left out in Figure 4.2 for clarity, it is shown (error state unreachable) in section 
4.2 that a two-place buffer suffices for each Wire. 
4.2  Verification of the Enhanced Model 
A key correctness property of the root contention protocol is that eventually, exactly 
one of the processes is elected as root. This property is described by the automaton 
Spec in Figure 4.3. We demonstrate that Impl (the parallel composition of the two 
Node and Wire automata) is a correct implementation of Spec provided that Impl 
meets the timing constraint equations 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
start done root1! 
root2! 
 
Figure 4.3: The Uppaal Spec automaton of the root contention protocol 
The stepwise abstraction from [4], which is a widely used method in automaton-based 
verification, since it allows for separation of concerns, is mimicked, in order to 
explore the applicability of Uppaal to the method of stepwise abstraction. Rather than 
proving Impl  TTR Spec at once, we consider three intermediate automata I1, I2, and I3 
(from [4]) and use Uppaal to verify that Impl  TTR I1  TTR I2  TTR I3  TTR Spec. Here, 
I1 is a timed automaton, which abstracts from all message passing in Impl while 
preserving the timing information of Impl. The automaton I2 is obtained from I1 by 
removing all timing information. In I3 internal choices are further contracted. Since 
timing aspects are only present in Impl and I1, the timing parameters only play a role in 
the first inclusion (Impl  TTR I1). The necessity of the timing constraints will be 
established below. 
The First Intermediate Automaton 
The intermediate automaton I1 is displayed in Figure 4.4. It is a timed automaton 
variant of the timed I/O automaton model from [4], restricted to the reachable states. It 
abstracts from the communication between the nodes and records the status (start, 
fast, slow, or done) for each of the two nodes. Also, I1 has a clock x to impose timing 
constraints between events. The outgoing internal transitions from start_start, 
fast_start, start_fast, start_slow, and slow_start model the consecutive random bit 
selection of the two nodes. For example, fast_start corresponds to Node1 having 
picked the fast random bit, and Node2 still in root contention. The internal transitions 
from fast_fast and from slow_slow back to start_start represent the protocol restart, 
which is an option if the two random bits are equal. 
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Figure 4.4: The Uppaal I1 automaton of the root contention protocol 
The invariants on clock x cause both nodes to pick a random bit within time interval 
delay after the protocol (re-)start. Also, within an interval [rc_fast_min - delay, 
rc_fast_max] or [rc_slow_min - delay, rc_slow_max], which depends on the random 
bit, either a root is selected (root1! or root2!) or a restart of the protocol occurs. 
In line with section 3.2, unlabeled transitions in I1 are labeled, such that they 
synchronize with Impl (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2) according to the step refinement from 
Impl to I1 (not discussed here). The transitions in Node1 and Node2 of the random bit 
selection (snd_idle!, x:=0) are coupled to the corresponding transitions of 
random bit selection in I1, according to the fast/slow differentiation. Furthermore, an 
auxiliary automaton EchoRetry synchronizes with the protocol restart transitions in I1, 
as soon as both Node1 and Node2 have taken their snd_req! transition to the 
snt_req state. This results in the automata Implr and I1r. It is thus required that the 
Node and Wire automaton from Impl, and the I1 automaton are able to concurrently 
synchronize on the same label. Although Uppaal does not support multi-way 
synchronization, this was solved via auxiliary committed states and/or automata.  
Manual parameter analysis shows that the error-state is only reachable in Implr 

 I1r, if 
the constraint equations 2.1 and 2.2 do not hold. Therefore, as a direct consequence of 
Lemma 3.7, Proposition 4.1 holds: 
Result 4.1: If the timing parameters in Impl satisfy equations 2.1 and 2.2, then 
Impl  TTR I1. 
Although from these experiments, the converse cannot be concluded, it is not difficult 
to come up with scenarios that show the necessity of the timing constraints for 
protocol correctness. In Uppaal, we have checked that messages can get lost in the 
wire if equation 2.1 does not hold, and that if equation 2.2 does not hold, renewed root 
contention may also occur, in case the nodes pick different random bits. We conclude 
Proposition 4.2: 
Result 4.2: If the parameters in Impl do not satisfy equations 2.1 and 2.2,  
Impl is not a correct implementation of Spec. 
The Second Intermediate Automaton 
The intermediate automaton I2 is identical to I1, except that all timing information has 
been removed. Although timed trace inclusion is obvious, labeling internal transitions 
with identical source and target locations in I1 and I2 with the same, unique labels 
yields Proposition 4.3, as expected: 
Proposition 4.3: I1  TTR I2. 
The Third Intermediate Automaton 
Figure 4.5 shows intermediate automaton I3, in which internal choices have been 
further contracted. Selection of the two random bits is no longer represented via 
separate, subsequent transitions, but done at once via a single transition. Again, we 
added labels to certain unlabeled transitions in I2 and I3.  
 start 
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node2win 
done 
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Figure 4.5: The Uppaal I3 automaton of the root contention protocol 
For example, the transition in I2 from fast_start to fast_fast is coupled to the transition 
in I3 from start to no_win. Notice that the transitions in I2 leaving from start_start 
remain unlabeled. It has been established by Uppaal that I2r  TTR I3r. As an immediate 
corollary of Lemma 3.7, Proposition 4.5 holds: 
Proposition 4.5: I2  TTR I3. 
Since the specification automaton Spec is deterministic, we need only to check for 
reachability in the automaton Specerr to obtain Proposition 4.6: 
Proposition 4.6: I3  TTR Spec. 
This analysis results in the final conclusion as stated in Proposition 4.7: 
Result 4.7: The root contention protocol is correct if and only if the parameters 
in Impl satisfy equations 2.1 and 2.2. 
6   Conclusions 
In this case study, the mechanical verification of the IEEE 1394 root contention 
protocol using the Uppaal2k tool is presented. The manual verification of this protocol 
using I/O automata has been published in [4]. 
First, an enhanced Uppaal2k model of the root contention protocol is presented, 
that resolves imperfections in the model from [4]. With a new concept of signal 
communication, it now fully expresses the IEEE 1394a standard. 
Second, the correctness of the root contention protocol was verified, using stepwise 
abstraction via intermediate automata, in analogy with [4]. Via manual parameter 
analysis within Uppaal2k, constraints on the timing parameters for the correctness of 
the protocol, like the maximum communication delay, were deduced. These 
constraints exactly match the theoretical constraints, as discussed. Fortunately, the 
current IEEE 1394a standard also meets these constraints. 
Although Uppaal has not been designed for the applying method of stepwise 
abstraction, in our case study, this was quite easy. We recommend that, to fully exploit 
the method in Uppaal, the associated theory needs to be elaborated, and tool support 
should be provided, such as the automatic construction of the automata Aerr and, if 
possible, Ar. 
Third, it is concluded that model checkers like Uppaal are useful to study protocols 
and distributed algorithms, also in the presence of parameters. Especially the iterative 
modeling via trial and error, the exploration of protocol parameters, and the checking 
of invariant equations, are valuable. Once an appropriate model has been obtained, 
more complex aspects, such as rigorous parameter analysis and probabilistic facets 
can be analyzed. 
Finally, the fact that the modeling and verification took us a relatively short time, 
illustrates that model checkers can be used effectively in the design and evaluation of 
industrial protocols. 
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